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**Leadership and Organization Matter**

As we mentioned at the beginning, there seems to be increasing consensus among political scientists over the use of an ideational definition of populism. This approach assumes that populism is first and foremost a set of ideas characterized by the Manichean and moral distinction between “the people” versus “the elite” (e.g. Hawkins 2009; Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013a, 2017; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). Practically all the contributions to this special issue rely on this definition, and this is ultimately why the articles are talking about the same phenomenon. It is a substantial improvement in our scholarship, because it allows us to generate cumulative knowledge, foster academic dialogue and conduct cross-national and cross-regional research. Nevertheless, those who adhere to the ideational approach should take into account two other, less-than-ideational factors that are relevant for explaining the electoral success and failure of populist forces: leadershi

p and organizational resources. First of all, most populist forces hinge on the rise of a charismatic leader (Pappas 2016). Reasons for this are not entirely clear. The Essex School argues in a more ideational way that charismatic leaders provide a symbol into which adherents can read their individual identities; the leader thus creates and embodies the “popular identity” constituting populist forces (Laclau 2005). But an older, rationalist tradition from the political parties literature sees 8 Kirk A. Hawkins and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser © 2017 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2017) charismatic leadership as a way of overcoming collective action problems among materially focused, calculating voters and activists (Panebianco 1988). We would add that these collective action problems are compounded in a movement that encourages active individual participation while distrusting many of the political professionals who could coordinate their activities. Second, even when populist forces take the form of institutionalized parties rather than charismatic movements, such as many of the radical right populists in Europe, their electoral success depends on their capacity to develop and rely on organizational resources that endure over time (Art 2011; Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016; Mudde 2007). Citizens with active populist attitudes are not going to throw themselves into a cause that has little chance of success, either because the leadership cannot articulate a persuasive program or because they seem unlikely to “get things done.” While to some degree this depends on the momentum that populist leaders can build, momentum is fleeting unless it is backed up by an organization capable of articulating media strategies, gathering funds, and doing legwork. In this regard, the study of Aguilar and Carlin (2017, this issue) is instructive. They focus on a negative case study: contemporary Chile is a country in which conditions for the rise of populism are present (i.e. massive corruption scandals and growing challenges to democratic representation), but their experimental design reveals that the discourse of a well-known populist candidate named Roxana Miranda does not lead to increasing electoral support for her. While their findings are provisional, they point out that potential avenues for research are directly linked to leadership issues and the lack of organizational resources. On the one hand, it could be that Miranda’s position is too radical for the majority of the electorate, which has gone through a process of political learning after the collapse of democracy that the country experienced in the 1970s. On the other hand, it is quite clear that Miranda does not have any type of professional cadre and consequently has limited chances of building a political party, let alone governing. While studies like these are exciting advances, ideationally oriented scholars have yet to grapple with these material factors systematically. There is still no effort to conceptualize and precisely measure types of populist organization, especially across regions. Moreover, we do not persuasively incorporate these material factors into our ideational theories, for example, by seeing the material environment as a conditioning factor for the expression and mobilization of populist ideas. The nexus between rational decision making and powerful normative motivations is hazy. Much of this research probably has to occur at the individual level, where we can better study the psychology of populist voters. Nevertheless, scholars should keep in mind the meso level, particularly the different types of organizational features that populist forces employ.